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Abbreviations
BoG: Bank of Ghana
BoT: Bank of Tanzania
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FSP: Financial Service Providers
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
MFI: Microfinance Institutions
NGO: Non-Governmental Organizations
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SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa
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Abstract
This paper examines the financial sectors of Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania in relation to
the regulation of microfinance institutions, specifically looking into client protection
policies. The first section introduces the topic of microfinance in Sub-Saharan Africa, and
the impact it has on the financial sector. A frame of reference is created by a brief
introduction of the financial and regulatory climate in each of the three countries.
Following this introduction, regression analyses demonstrate the impact of client
protection policies on the performance of microfinance institutions in Ghana, Kenya, and
Tanzania.
Keywords: Microfinance, Client Protection, Sub-Saharan Africa
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1. Introduction
Financial institutions are powerful tools, essential for alleviating poverty in developing
countries. Providing the much-needed access to credit and savings instruments allows the
population to take control of their financial well-being. Giving the impoverished the
capability to balance their own budgets, and allocate their resources as they see fit can
bring increased stability in income, and therefore greater quality of living. Many of the
poor, notably those in rural areas, earn their living through seasonal ventures such as
farming. In many African countries, small and medium sized enterprises account for 70%
of GDP and employ up to 75% of the poor. (Oshadare & Apelogun) These small
business owners may prosper for a few months, and then experience a lull in their
production and therefore income. Those who make the bulk of their profits during a short
period of time, have to keep their money safe while rationing it for the future. Deposittaking institutions can protect their funds until they are ready to withdraw them. Another
important service that many financial institutions offer is credit provision, which can
supplement earnings in years or seasons where profits are low. In many countries in
Africa, Microfinance Institutions (MFI’s), along with other Non-Bank Financial
Institutions (NBFI’s) have grown exponentially in the last two decades. It has been
reported that, “over 100 million customers worldwide borrow small loans from around
10,000 MFIs.” (Barry & Tacneng, 2011) Many of these MFI’s are in Africa, and are
attempting to fill gaps in the traditional banking sector. Studies have shown that countries
who report larger microfinance industries tend to have lower levels of poverty. (Abdulai
& Tewari, 2016) As this industry grows, governments are struggling to provide adequate
regulations (Ndambu).
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1.1 Types of Microfinance Institutions
In general, MFI’s fall into one of three tiers based on level of formality. The tiers are
outlined in Table 1, along with examples of institutions in each tier.
Table 1: Tiers of MFIs
Tier

Description

Formal

These are the most
regulated institutions, often
under supervision of central
banks. These organizations
are generally focused on
making a profit.
Semi-Formal
These organizations are
generally less regulated and
are often the groups focused
on the humanitarian aspects
of microfinance.
Informal
These groups are frequently
unregulated, but are the
most numerous. They are
usually quite small and
focus on local markets.
Source: (Oshadare & Apelogun)

Examples of Institutions
Microfinance Banks, Rural
Banks

Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs)

Rotating Savings and Credit
Associations (ROSCA),
Local money lenders, Small
Business Owners

These institutions all operate at various levels of efficiency. It has been found that formal
institutions are the most efficient, while informal are the least efficient, with an exception
that NGOs are frequently among the most efficient NBFIs. (Abdulai & Tewari, 2016)
1.2 Demand for Microfinance Institutions
Using data from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) in 2010, the United
Nations found that NGOs were the most widely used microfinance institutions, followed
by cooperatives, NBFIs, then microfinance banks. (2013) The banks however reported
the highest levels of growth. This data can be used to estimate the demand for various
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types of MFIs, but it should be noted that MIX collects data that is self-reported from
companies who choose to provide information, thus there may be biases in the data. One
possible issue is that the organizations that are most likely to report to MIX are those who
are performing well and operating efficiently, which as was previously mentioned, is the
NGOs. This could skew the data and overestimate the ratio of NGO usage to other MFIs.
Another important consideration is the lack of reporting by smaller NBFIs such as
ROSCAs. These small, local groups do not provide information to MIX and therefore are
unaccounted for in this measure of demand. (United Nation, 2013) Also, it is notable that
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) had the highest growth rate of depositors compared to other
global regions around this time. The two dominant types of loans in SSA are
consumption loans (55%) and small business loans (40%). In 2018, MIX boasts data for
309 MFIs in SSA, with $10.44 billion in their gross loan portfolios and 6.87 million
active borrowers. (MIX) The MFIs who lend credit tend to focus on short-term loans in
attempt to minimize risk. (Barry & Tacneng, 2011) The MFI market in SSA is growing
rapidly, and the supply is ever increasing to match demand.
1.3 Countries of Interest
In 2008, seven countries received almost 50% of the total funding committed by various,
largely non-commercial funders to MFIs in Sub Saharan Africa. These seven countries
were Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Mali, and Mozambique. Over $75
million was committed to each of the following countries: Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania.
(MIX & CGAP, 2008) These three countries have a large supply of funding for MFIs,
along with various differences in their consumer protection policies. Comparing these
three countries will provide us a good sample size with a reasonable number of data
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points from various types and sizes of MFIs. The rest of the paper will be structured as
follows: historical background, MFI statistics, regulations, and consumer protection
sections for each of the three aforementioned countries, followed by the introduction to
the data set, methodology, results and conclusion.

2. Literature Review
2.1 Importance of Regulation
As MFIs establish an increased presence in SSA, the regulation of these organizations
becomes an important topic of discussion. Many of these Microfinance Institutions focus
on lending and taking deposits from the middle and lower classes. Often these lower
income clients are viewed as risky, especially in countries that do not currently have a
method of credit reporting. Frequently, when lenders are unsure of the borrower’s ability
to pay back the loans they charge higher interest rates, which can in turn hurt those who
are borrowing the funds. There are a multitude of other examples of issues that may arise
when proper regulations are not in place. These problems can negatively impact the
clients as well as the MFIs themselves.
One approach to regulation is to establish separate legislation for MFIs. As of
2008, there were 29 countries in SSA that had created specialized MFI legislation, 14 that
grouped MFIs with other banks and put them under already established banking
regulations, and 3 countries reported no regulation of MFIs. (Ndambu). Occasionally
governments will create specialized bodies to supervise the practices of MFIs. (Oshadare
& Apelogun)
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Many recommend that countries impose strict regulations with punishments for
those institutions that do not comply. One of the biggest flaws with this plan is that
frequently, countries do not have the means to enforce the regulations. (Oshadare &
Apelogun) There is also the matter of balancing regulations that are vital versus those
that create significant barriers to entry for new organizations. These countries do not want
to deter MFIs by making their markets too troublesome to enter. (Ali 2015)
Regulations are intended to keep the financial sector functional and healthy. The
government walks the line between over regulation with potential harms to the MFIs and
under regulation with potential harms to the consumer. MFIs generally have their own
risk aversion strategies and crisis handling capabilities. Consumers on the other hand, are
inherently less protected and are individually less powerful than these organizations. It is
vital that the government establishes regulations that will protect their citizens and allow
them to participate in the financial markets in a safe, low risk manner.
In 2006 there were 8 MFIs in Rwanda that were forcibly closed down due to
“gross mismanagement, poor credit management practices, failure to meet minimal
conditions for licensing, and loss of customer confidence.” (United Nations, 2013) This
eye-opening news serves as a call to action. In efforts to help alleviate poverty and
establish a stable financial sector, some institutions were allowing customers to accrue
massive amounts of debt. Some also had convoluted pricing structures, were using unfair
methods of collecting loan payments, and were operating in all around unethical ways.
(United Nations, 2013) Customer protection regulations have been written up, but in
many countries these laws are still in the process of being approved and amended. (GIZ
2011) Some important areas of consumer protection include: transparency, fair and
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appropriate treatment of clients, data privacy measures, and methods to handle consumer
complaints. (United Nations, 2013) These sorts of regulations will not only allow
consumers to make smart choices, but also they will establish a sense of trustworthiness
in the MFIs. Consumers will feel more comfortable using their services when they do not
hear stories of their relatives and neighbors being deceived or abused for profits. (GIZ
2011)
These consumer protections have especially come into question recently as the
digital financial market has grown significantly over the past few years. Financial Service
Providers (FSPs) moving to online platforms increase the ease of access and inclusion of
people who may not live in locations with physical branches of MFIs or traditional banks.
It is however, quite easy to con people on digital platforms. There is also an increased
security threat when providing personal data online to companies you may not know
much about. One study found that the privacy policies of international digital lending
institutions, 55% of which were sampled from SSA, were written at an average reading
level of grade 13. (Traynor, 2018) This statistic is particularly worrisome when you
consider the average level of education of the clients these services are intended for. It
becomes obvious that these privacy policies are not meant to be read and understood by
those agreeing to them, which creates large issues for consumers who think they are safe
disclosing personal information to the online service providers.
The same study looked into how secure the mobile applications for these FSPs
are. They found many concerning issues in regards to securing consumer data. Some
applications were even vulnerable to an attack from a third party, impersonating the
server and therefore accessing consumer data they should not be privy to. (Traynor,
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2018) These results are concerning, and it is vital that governments step in to protect
their citizens and ensure that they are not allowing unfair and unsafe practices in their
countries. The question is then, how do consumer protection regulations impact the
MFIs?
Some researchers were interested in testing the impact of increased regulation on
the performance of MFIs. The results show that public auditing has a positive impact on
MFI performance, while general banking regulations and rating systems show no
significant impact on the performance of these institutions. (Barry & Tacneng, 2011)
Others have found that external governance has a positive impact on profitability and
self-sufficiency, while negatively impacting depth of outreach. (Barry & Tacneng, 2011).
2.2 Ghana
a. MFI Environment in Ghana
Ghana has a strong past in finance in Africa, as it is suggested that the first credit union in
Africa was established there in 1955. Various other types of financial institutions have
blossomed in the country since that time including rural and community banks, savings
and loan companies, SuSus, which are informal loan clubs originating from Nigeria, and
other NBFIs. (Bank of Ghana, 2007) Although financial institutions have been around for
many decades in Ghana, they experienced slow growth for a long time. Recently, there
was a period of rapid growth in the early 2000’s, when the number of loans from NBFI’s
quadrupled in a matter of five years. (Bank of Ghana, 2007) This stimulated demand for
some sort of solid regulatory framework, but these laws are still evolving and have not
seen very much change since around this time period.
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In 2017 there were 566 MFIs of various types according to the Bank of Ghana
(BoG), but this figure does not reflect the informal MFIs that were not reported directly
to the BoG. The estimates are observable in Table 2. (Bank of Ghana, July 2017) These
data do not capture every MFI, but do include the vast majority.
Table 2: MFI Break Down in Ghana
Year

Type of MFI

Quantity

Informal
(Data from 2009)

Credit Unions

529

SuSu Collectors

1,500-4,500

Microfinance Companies

484

Moneylending Companies

70

Financial NGOs

12

Formal and Semi-Formal
(Data from 2012)

Source: (Bank of Ghana, July 2017) and (GIZ 2011)
Table 3 contains information about the kinds of financial institutions different groups of
the population were using as of 2009. Examining the data provides evidence that
although there are many services offered, there is still a large portion of the population
who cannot take advantage of these institutions, predominantly those in rural areas.
Table 3: MFI Usage in Ghana
MFI Tier

Urban

Rural

Total

Formal

52%

21%

34%

Semi-Formal

9%

5%

7%

Informal

11%

18%

15%

No Usage (due to choice or lack of access)

29%

55%

44%

Source (GIZ 2011)
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b. Client Protection in Ghana
In general, the areas of client protection that are emphasized in Ghana are the safety of
the deposits and the protection of client information. These are very important parts of
client protection, but they are not thoroughly developed, nor is there much breadth of
regulation. There are other areas of protection as well that are less rigorously regulated
than what we see in western countries. The Bank of Ghana has set forth some
requirements for transparency of MFIs to help consumers. They have also established a
credit reporting system for FSPs to submit credit information on borrowers. These steps
will help form a stable financial market in Ghana, but enforcing the regulations is still an
issue. There has also been an increase in customer complaints, almost doubling from 265
cases in 2005 to 508 cases in 2008. (GIZ 2011) This is a sign that although regulations
are improving, there is still much room for amelioration. The power of the regulations
seems to be largely nominal at this time. In 2016 there was a code created that outlined
proper ways to handle consumer complaints, which extended to the online FSPs, a
frequently neglected market. (Bank of Ghana, Feb. 2017) It is also important to note that
there are two microfinance facilitators currently in Ghana who are in the midst of
campaigns to teach their customers financial literacy. (Center for Financial Inclusion)
Programs like these can greatly benefit consumers and assist them in making informed
decisions. Educating clients on how to decide the size of the loan they need, or teaching
them budgeting techniques are very small steps can help them avoid over-indebtedness
which will be better for not only themselves, but the institutions they borrow from in the
long run as well.
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2.3 Kenya
a. MFI Environment in Kenya
In the 1980’s and 1990’s, Kenya developed policies that were aimed at liberalizing their
financial markets. This allowed for the establishment and growth of MFIs, insurance
companies, and a stock exchange. NBFIs grew rapidly, soon passing up the number of
commercial banks, so by 1994, Kenya boasted 50 NBFIs whose cumulative deposits were
equivalent to 14% of the country’s GDP. (Brownbridge,1996) Commercial banks held
more cumulative deposits even though there were less of them. In 2006 the formal
process for licensing and regulating MFIs was placed under the responsibility of the
Central Bank of Kenya. The SACCO Act of 2009 started turning SACCOs (Savings and
Credit Cooperative Organizations) into formal, regulated financial institutions. 2010 is
when mobile financial services started to rapidly increase in popularity in Kenya. MPESA, owned by Safaricom and Vodafone, is the predominant mobile FSP in the Kenyan
market, offering services like fund transfers and banking services. (GIZ 2011) This was
also the time period around which lenders started using systems of credit reporting,
accessible to other FSPs. (Central Bank of Kenya) Although Kenya now has one of the
most developed financial systems in Sub Saharan Africa, they still face issues with
corruption and lack of supervision. (GIZ 2011)
In Kenya, MFI usage statistics have changed greatly over the last few years as
mobile financial services have become popular and accessible. Since Kenya has started
formalizing SACCOs, that also increases the ratio of formal and semi-formal institutions
to informal institutions in comparison with many other countries in SSA who categorize
SACCOs into their informal financial markets. The quantity of each type of formal and
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semi-formal MFI in Kenya is listed below in Table 4. There were additional types of
institutions, including the informal institutions, for which data was not available.
Table 4: MFI Break Down in Kenya
Tier

Institution Type

Quantity

Formal

Commercial Banks

44

Mortgage Finance Companies

2

Foreign Exchange Bureaus

130

Deposit Taking MFIs

3

Deposit Taking SACCOs (estimate)

215

Non-Deposit Taking SACCOs

3,000-5,000

Semi-Formal

Source (GIZ 2011)

In Kenya, commercial banks and informal MFIs are the most frequently used FSPs,
though usage of all types of MFIs has increased in the last decade. In Table 5, data is
shown that compares the usage of different types of FSPs over the period of 2006 to
2016. It is important to note that the mobile financial services have grown much faster
than any other type of service, but have not kept the other types of FSPs from growing.
This is a sign that in general, the financial market as a whole is still growing in Kenya,
which heightens the need for regulation and consumer protection as more and more
citizens are becoming involved.
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Table 5: Usage in Kenya
Institution Type

2006

2009

2013

2016

Bank

14%

21%

29%

38%

SACCO

13%

9%

11%

13%

Other Informal

32%

36%

28%

41%

Mobile

N/A

28%

62%

71%

Source: (Central Bank of Kenya, 2016()
b. Client Protection in Kenya
The topic of client protection contains a vast array of strategies and techniques to make
consumers feel secure using your services, that way they will choose to do business with
your institution. One way to examine the success of client protection programs could be
to look at data measuring the level of trust that consumers have in various financial
institutions. The Central Bank of Kenya published a table with the trust levels of their
citizens in their FSPs. This data showed that commercial banks were the most trusted by
rural and urban populations. For both of these groups, mobile financial services were the
second most trusted, but fascinatingly enough, when examining specifically mobile bank
accounts, one can see that these are the least trusted. It is also important to note that urban
citizens generally have greater trust in financial institutions across the board. The
percentage of rural citizens who said they do not trust any financial institutions was
almost twice as high as this statistic for the urban demographic. (Central Bank of Kenya,
2016)
Frequently MFIs and banks are subject to the same level of regulation in Kenya.
The Central Bank of Kenya has many methods in which it attempts to monitor FSPs, but
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they face a variety of issues when it comes to enforcing these rules. One example is that
when the CBK asks FSPs to report certain information to them, such as the bank fees,
there is no standardized method that they ask them to follow. (GIZ 2011) This could be a
problem because institutions may be able to manipulate their numbers in a direction that
is more beneficial for them. The Central Bank of Kenya also attempts to handle some
disputes because they do not have rules for providing dispute resolution, but they can
only take so many cases. (GIZ 2011) One more area that Kenya chooses to regulate
heavily when it comes to MFIs is their advertising. There are regulations in place that
help stop misleading advertising campaigns from FSPs. The Central Bank of Kenya is
trying to protect their citizens from being taken advantage of, but it will be compelling to
see how regulations are adapted in reaction to the recent expansion of mobile financial
services.
2.4 Tanzania
a. MFI Environment in Tanzania
In Tanzania, the financial sector has been evolving rapidly since the 1980’s and 1990’s
when the government started to enact reforms that reduced barriers to entry, allowing for
significant growth in the private sector. Shortly after these changes, the government also
privatized the commercial banks they owned. Then, they increased the regulatory power
of the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) over MFI’s. (Chuku & Ndanshau, 2016) In the 1990’s, the
financial sector grew from 10 institutions to almost 800, and by 1998 they had
established a stock exchange. (Gallardo et al. 2005) More recently, there has recently
been a push to formalize rural and community MFIs, as well as NGOs, so they could be
licensed and regulated. This would likely have a noticeable effect on SACCOs, which are
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the most popular form of MFI in Tanzania, as well as organizations like the Foundation
for International Community Assistance, a microloan provider operating with funding
from donors. (Gallardo et al. 2005)
In Tanzania, the financial sector has been developing quickly, but there are still
some types of institutions that do not exist in large numbers. As with Ghana and Kenya,
smaller, more local institutions have the most clients in total. Table 6 contains data
showing the number of recorded institutions for each type of FSP in Tanzania, excluding
informal institutions, of which the quantities are unknown.
Table 6: MFI Break Down in Tanzania
Tier

Institution

Quantity

Formal

Commercial Banks

27

Financial Institutions

13

Foreign Exchange Bureaus

176

SACCOS

2,500-5,200

Financial NGOs

5

Semi-Formal

Source: (GIZ 2011)
The number of financial institutions in Tanzania does not seem to be correlated with the
number clients each type has. For example, there are many more informal institutions
than formal, but a larger percent of the population reports holding accounts at formal
MFIs. Table 7 includes data about the percentage of users in each tier of Microfinance
Institutions in Tanzania, excluding Zanzibar.
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Table 7: Usage in Tanzania
Tier

% of Adults Using MFI Type

Formal

9%

Semi-Formal

4%

Informal

35%

No Usage (due to choice or lack of access)

52%

Source (GIZ 2011)
b. Client Protection in Tanzania
Generally the Bank of Tanzania is responsible for the external regulation of MFIs, which
means that they have significant power over the steps these FSPs are taking to protect the
clients they serve. The overarching microfinance regulations require some sort of contract
between the service provider and the client. These contracts must include things like the
interest rate for loans, which the provider may not change without first consulting the
client. (GIZ 2011) The BoT, in 2006, set up a credit reporting system to assist financial
institutions with the decision of which clients to take on. This helps consumers as well
because clients who take out loans from a multitude of FSPs, accumulating significant
amounts of debt, hurt themselves in the long run due to the fact that they are unable to
repay the loans. (Boston University) They also implemented the Fair Competition Act,
which helps prevent monopolies from taking over and charging outrageous prices for
their services with unreasonably high interest rates. (GIZ 2011) These regulations ensure
a certain degree of client protection from potential abuses of MFIs.
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3. Hypothesis and Methodology
In looking at the affects of increased client protection regulations, it would be useful to
assess the potential impacts of on the efficiency of MFIs. In analyzing data from the
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX), we have access to various performance
indicators, as well as what types of client protection individual MFIs offer. By comparing
performance over time to the increase in consumer protection regulation, which was the
result of increased regulatory laws in all three of these countries, we can attempt to draw
some conclusions about how increased client protection affects the MFIs. In order to
examine this, we can test the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis: An increase in client protection policies does not negatively impact
the performance and efficiency of individual MFIs in Sub Saharan Africa.

If client protection measures have no effect or a positive effect on MFIs, then it is
worthwhile for them to enact these policies. One of the reasons to believe increasing
client protection would have no effect or a positive affect is that these protection
measures allow the MFIs to attract more clients. More people will trust them and feel
secure using their financial services, so they can attract more business. Another reason to
anticipate that performance may be positively correlated with client protection policies is
that the consumers who are more risk averse are less likely to use financial services they
see as unsafe. This means that those consumers would likely not use the financial
services of MFIs without protection measures in place. The clients that unregulated MFIs
could expect to see may be riskier and less likely to pay back loans. If this is true,
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regulations could help attract better clients, therefore reducing the risk the business takes
on, and in turn, increasing their performance. Finally, many client protection measures
focus on measuring a client’s risk of over-indebtedness, which would be beneficial for
the MFIs to be aware of before choosing whether or not to allow a potential client to use
their services. For these reasons, it is plausible that consumer protection regulations will
have no negative impact on MFI performance.
To test this hypothesis, we can examine the data from MIX to compare the growth
of consumer protection regulations to the performance of MFIs over time. The time
period examined in this study is 2009-2014. Data was gathered at the institutional level in
each of the three countries discussed in this paper and compared. The client protection
measures served as the independent variables. Three measures of client protection were
used in this study providing the following independent variables:

IAVOP: Internal Audits Verify Over-indebtedness Protection - This accounted
for whether or not the MFIs were screening clients before taking them on.

CDCP: Clear Debt Collection Practices – This variable measured whether or not
the MFIs had well outlined debt collection practices. This variable was used to
represent the degree to which the MFIs had policies that their clients could
understand.
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FCCS: Functioning Client Complaint System – This helps measure the ability of
clients to resolve any disputes that may arise in regards to the financial services
they are utilizing.

To examine the effect of these variables on MFIs, I chose several performance
indicators below. These data, which serve as our dependent variables, are various
measures in which it is possible to note the change in performance of MFIs over time.
Each of these variables was logged to minimize skewness.

LOG Assets: Assets - MIX Market defines assets as the “total value of resources
controlled by the Financial Services Providers,” which can measure the overall
financial wellbeing of these institutions.

LOG DPSM: Depositors Per Staff Member - This is the ratio of depositors to
staff members, which can provide a measure of efficiency within the MFI.

LOG GLP: Gross Loan Portfolio - This is the value of outstanding loan
principles, which can be used to gauge the amount of business an MFI is
conducting.

LOG NUM DA: Number of Deposit Accounts - This is the number of deposit
accounts that each MFI is liable to pay back. This is also an indicator of the
amount of business each MFI is getting.
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In order to conduct the experiment, I ran a regression with time fixed effects and country
fixed effects. I ran the regression four times, regressing each dependent variable on the
three client protection variables, incorporating the aforementioned fixed effects.
4. Results
The results of the regressions are included on the following pages in Tables 8-11. In
examining these data points, we see that many of the coefficients are positive and
statistically significant, which indicates that we can reject a null hypothesis, so client
protection programs do indeed have an overall positive relationship with MFI
performance. When examining the individual client protection policies however, it is
notable that the “internal audits verify over-indebtedness” variable’s coefficient was
negative in each regression, and generally very significant. The “functional client
complaint system” seems to have a positive and significant correlation with MFI
performance. Our third client protection variable, “clear debt collection practices” was
always positive, although never significant. Following the tables, I will discuss some of
the potential flaws in this experiment.
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One of the potential drawbacks to the data used in this study is that the sample size was
very small relative to the number of MFIs in each of these countries. One reason why this
may be the case is that the data from MIX is self-reported, so many institutions,
especially smaller ones, do not provide them any data. This can also cause problems in
that the institutions that are well run are the ones most likely to provide information.
FSPs who are struggling or do not treat their clients well, are unlikely to submit that to
MIX. One potential solution to the small sample size would be to look at MFI level data
for larger regions of Africa, rather than specific countries. This could also help normalize
any countries who may have a better than average financial sector.
7. Conclusion
This experiment provided very interesting results, and there is a significant number of
questions that it brings up, however. The first question is: why there is a negative
relationship between the over-indebtedness checks and performance of an MFI? I
hypothesized that over-indebtedness checks would benefit institutions because they
would not provide loans to clients who are less likely to pay them back. The negative
impact could stem from the fact that turning away clients would lower their gross loan
portfolio, even though the loans they do make might be more likely to be paid back.
Another area of interest that could be further explored would be case studies for an indepth look at the performance of a few MFIs over time. Some MFIs have consistently
provided data since far before 2009, but not very many, so those years were not included.
Looking back at the country level research however, many changes to MFI regulations
were made in the first decade of the 2000’s, so if we could examine data from further
before the regulations, we may see a larger impact on performance. Finally, it would be
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ideal to capture data from more semi-formal and informal institutions, which were not
well represented in this sample. Unfortunately, data from these institutions is much
harder to come by. If smaller, less regulated institutions with fewer client protection
policies perform worse than these sampled MFIs, we could see a greater impact of these
client protection variables on the performance. These protection policies help clients
establish a sense of trust in the institutions they are putting their money into, and in the
long run this will improve the financial sector in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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